This paper studies the in1pact of uncertain de1nand on firn1s 1 capacity decisions when they operate in an oligopolistic environ111ent. VVe define a two-stage game where firn1s choose capacity in the first stage without knowing which state of nature is going to realize, and output levels in the second, knowing which state is realized. VVe prove the existence of a syn1metric subgame perfect equilibrium at which firms are in excess capacity compared with the capacity they would choose in the Cournot certainty equivalent gan1e.
Introduction
This paper studies the impact of uncertain demand on firms' capacity decisions \Vhen they operate in an oligopolistic e11viron1nent. The effect of uncertain demand fluctuatious on expected profits. expected price and capacity in competitive. or monopolistic industries has been extensively analysed (sec Oi (1961) . Sandmo (1971) . Leland (1972) , Dreze and Gabszewicz ( 1967), Smith (19G9) , Dreze and Sheshinski (1976) ). To the best of our knowledge, no similar contributions have been devoted to the same problem, with assuming that demand fluctuations are faced by firms in a context of strategic interaction.
1 This context implies that firms must adjust their capacity not only in view of meeting output demand levels varying acroso the states of Nature, but also for providing best output replies against the capacity and output strategies chosen by rival firms. In this random environment, firms play a game simultaneously against Nature and against their rivals. We assume however a kind of sequentiality in this intertwined game: when firms have to make their output decisions, they know which state the Nature has chosen; but they do not know it when they make their capacity choice. This situation lends itself to be formalized as a two-period sequential game in which firms choose capacity in the first stage (without knowing which state is going to realize), and output levels in the second (knowing which state is realized). In the second stage. firms play a Cournot game, conditional on the capacity levels decided in the first stage. If, between the first and the second stage, Nature has chosen a "boom" demand function, a firm with a low capacity level chosen in the first stage is unable to play in the second stage the Cournot output corresponding to the boom, but can at best, play a quantity equal to its chosen capacity. On the contrary, if Nature has chosen a "recession" demand function, a firm having chosen a high capacity level can play the Cournot output corresponding to recession, but remains with a costly idle capacity. A subgame perfect equilibrium of the two-stage game defined above must take simultaneously into account the strategic aspects of firms' behaviour and the cost considerations related to possible underutilization of capacity.
Our model assumes that total demand varies linearly with output in each state of Nature: with a randon1 intercept over the states. The industry consists of two firms. each with tho same cost structure of the inelastic type. For this context. first we prove the existence of a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium. Then. we fully characterize it, in terms of the capacity chosen ttt equilibrium and of the set of states at which firms decide, for reducing the cost of capacity. to choose a capacity smaller than the Cournot output level corresponding to these states.
Under pure competition, it is known that firms operate production, on average, at a level which is smaller than capacity. This is due to the fact that the number of firms for which expected profits are equal to zero, exceeds the number of firms for which the average cost of output per firm is minimum (see, for instance, Dreze and Sheshinski (1976) ). Here we obtain an analogous excess capacity property when we compare the capacity chosen by the firms at the symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium, with the capacity they would choose if they would play a Cournot game with a "certainty equivalent" demand function. We found that uncertain capacity chosen by the firms at the symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium is at least greater than or equal to the capacity they would choose if they would play a Cournot game with "certainty equivalent'' demand function. By contrast, expected output and expected price are shown to coincide at equilibrium with the output and price resulting from the same Cournot "certainty equivalent" game.
We present the model and the two-stage game in section 2. Section 3 is devoted to the existence and characterization of the symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium for the two-stage game defined in section 2. Section 4 compares the duopoly solution with the monopoly case. and with the "certainty equivalent" Cournot game. We end up with some concluding remarks collected in section 5.
The model
We consider two fir1ns with the sarne cost structure facing uncertain de111and.
The cost structure is of inelastic type: when production does not exceed capacity. costs increase linearly with output; when production exceeds capacity, costs are infinite, i.e.
C(k, q)
We assume that there are n states of Nature and the demand in state i is given by
with Q denoting aggregate supply. Furthermore we assume that Ai > 'Y + {3,
We study a two-stage game in which firms choose capacity k 1 and k 2 in the first stage and output levels q 1 and q 2 in the second stage. When choosing capacity, firms do not know which state will realize, while they choose output knowing which state has realized. We assume the existence of an objective probability density pi, i = 1, ... , n. over the states of Nature, E7=t Pi = 1. Firms are assumed to be risk-neutral. We are interested in a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium corresponding to firms' strategies (k;, q;);=t,2, in which firm j chooses first capacity k; and then output level q;. (1)
It is easy to verify that, when both firms' capacities kt and k2 exceed the Cournot output At i Y in state i~ the unique second stage "unconstrainedi' Nash equilibrium is given by ( A3 Y, A;:J ' 1 ) in state i. When both firms' capacities k 1 and k 2 are smaller than the Cournot outcome A, 3 -y in state i, the unique second stage Nash equilibrium in state i is given by (k1, k2)-In the asymmetric case, when k; 2 A3 Y while kh < Aii 'Y, the unique second stage Nash equilibrium
' , kh where ' 2 ' is the best reply output of firm j against kh. In the next section, we characterize a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE) and prove its existence. This symmetry allows us to define the first-stage game payoffs only on a restricted set of first stage strategies (k 1 , kz).
The symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE)
To characterize a SSPE, we shall write the first stage payoff of each firm under the assumption that both firms in the second stage are constrained (resp. unconstrained) by capacity on exactly the same subset of states of Nature. Indeed this property must necessarily hold at a SSPE whenever it exists: in such an equilil>-rinm, both firms choose the same capacity level, which implies that unconstrained Cournot outcomes can be reached by both firms on exactly the same subset of states. Accordingly, in order to characterize a SSPE, we have only to consider the second stage equilibria which are given by (k 1 , k 2 ) in those states where capacity constraints are active, and by (A, -'I, A, 3 7 ) in those states i where firms are not constrained by installed capacity. Since A, < A,+ 1 for all i = 1, ... , n, it is clear that if capacities (k1,k2) are binding for some states (namely, k1 and k 2 are less than A.,31), they will be also binding for all states i, wheres< i < n.
Denoting by;• the largest index of states for which capacities are not binding. expected payoff "'i (k1. k2) for firm 1 is given by and by II,; (k1. k2). with for firm 2.
Consider a candidate SSPE of the two stage game, and let i' denote that state for which. at the corresponding candidate, both firms are not constrained up to state i', but constrained in the states s with i' + 1 :S s :S n. At this candidate subgame perfect equilibrium. first-order conditions for a maximum should be satisfied. that is,
It is easy to verify that the second order conditions for a maximum are also satisfied. Now (4) holds¢>
n n 2 I: Ps
n n 2 I: p,
Using the symmetry property. we solve the above system for k1 = kz = k•, say, which yields (6) Notice in particular that, if it is optimal for the firm to choose i' + l to be equal to 1, so that the firm chooses to be constrained in all states, then we get 
Proof. To be a part of a SSPE with both firms unconstrained up to state i", k' must exceed the Cournot outcome under state i', i.e. k' =". A;· 3 -y, an inequality which is satisfied if, and only if. the right inequality of (8) holds. By a similar argument, it must be necessarily true that k' < A,. +j -'I, an inequality which is satisfied if, and only if, the left inequality of (8) holds.
• So far we have shown that, to be a part of a SSPE in which both firms are not capacity constrained up to state i*, capacities must be defined by (6) and satisfy the parametric conditions (8). Yet, this is not sufficient to guarantee that (k', k') is a SSPE. We have still to prove that, under (8), no unilateral strategic deviation from k' can be advantageous to any firm. Proof. See appendix for the detailed proof. Here we provide a sketch of the proof. Consider that firm 1 deviates from k• by increasing its capacity to a level k 1 which exceeds k•, while firm 2 stays at k'. As soon as k 1 exceeds the Cournot outcome in state ' i.' " + 1, firrn 1 is no longer capacity-constrained in i* + 1; accordingly) the payoff in the first stage game as a function of ki is no longer provided by (2). Prom now on. firm 1 can play it., best reply against k' in all second stage games con~sponding to states where these best replies are smaller or equal to k 1 . Thus, given k 1 • the first stage game payoff of firm 1 consists of three terms: the first term corresponds to the expected profit obtained from playing the Cournot outcome in all states a ::,:; i'; the second term corresponds to the expected profit of playing the best replies against k' in all second stage games corresponding to states where the best replies are smaller or equal to kl. The third term represents the expected profit over all states where the capacity k 1 is not large enough to produce the best reply against k' in the corresponding states (the mathematical expression of this payoff is provided by formula (I) in the appendix). For instance, assume that k 1 belongs to the interval [R,·+1( 
(expected payoff over the st.ates where the firm is constrained to play k 1 ). It is shown in the appendix that the graph corresponding to this payoff can be represented as in figure l, where the graph of the payoff rr,. (kl' k') is also plotted. The interesting fact is that the graph of II,·+1(k 1 ,k') is not only strictly concave, but it "cuts" the graph of II,. (k 1 , k') when k 1 is equal to the best reply R·+1 (k•) in their respective decreasing parts. From this we conclude that the payoff rr,.+ 1 (k1. k') for k 1 E [R,.+ 1 (k•), R;·+2(k")[ is smaller than the payoff II,.+ 1 (R,.+ 1 (k'),k'). which itself is equal to II,.(R,·+ 1 (k'),k'). Furthermore, we know that II;·(R,. 
It is shown in the appendix that the graph of rr,. _ 1 (k 1 , k') can be represented as on figure 2 where the graph of the payoff rr,. (k 1 , k') is also plotted. The interesting fact is that not only the graph of rr,._ 1 (k 1 , k') is strictly concave, but it "cuts" show that no deviation kl <:' . k• can be profitable for firm 1. Applying a similar argument for deviations of firm 2 leads to a complete proof of proposition 2.
A comparison with monopoly and with the uncertainty equivalent case
It is interesting to compare the duopoly solution which as just been derived with the monopoly case. Given state i, the monopolist's optimal output is A; i Y.
As under duopoly, the monopolist, facing the same uncertain demand and the same cost conditions, can freely choose its capacity and, accordingly, the subset of states under which this capacity exceeds the monopoly output in the corresponding states. If the monopolist's capacity km is chosen so as to be unconstrained up to state im, expected profit writes as
The first order condition for a maximum requires that
An argument similar to the one used in the duopoly case shows that exactly the same condition on {3 (see equation (8)) as in the duopoly case, guarantees that it is indeed optimal for the monopolist to choose km so as to be unconstrained up to state im. However, a direct comparison betweeu (9) and (6) reveals that k;,. < 2k', so that total installed capacity in the duopoly case exceeds the installed capacity under monopoly. Now, it is also of interest to compare both monopoly and duopoly capacities with the certainty equivalent case. This case is defined as a deterministic market, in which the demand function P(Q) would be equal to the expected demand function resulting from the randomness of demand over the n states of Nature, i.e. with Q denoting aggregate supply.
In the dnopoly situation, it is easy to check that the Cournot outcome corresponding to the certainty equivalent case is given by n (10) so that it coincides with the duopoly solution ki = k2 = k' under uncertainty when firms choose to be constrained over all states (see (7)). In all other cases, when it is optimal for the firms to be constrained over a restricted set of states only, we get that k' > k, with k' defined by (6). Indeed. assume on the contrary that k' ' .;; k, with both firms having chosen to be constrained from state i' + 1 onwards. This implies that ,.
Using the right hand side of (8), which holds since it is optimal for the firms to be constrained from state i' + 1 onwards, we get
s=i•+t Thus, combining (11) and (12) At the monopoly, the certainty equivalent optimal capadty km obtains as (13) A similar argument as in proposition 3 shows that, whenever it is optimal for the monopolist to be unconstrained in a least one state, then monopolist's optimal capacity k;,, exceeds km.
Finally, it is worthwhile to perform some further comparisons. First, notice that market excess capacity, obtained by aggregating firms excess capacities as referred in proposition 3, is greater under duopoly than under monopoly. Indeed, market excess capacity in the monopoly case is equal to k;,, -km;. As under duopoly, market excess capacity is equal to 2(k' -k), and a direct comparison using (9), (13), (6) and (10), reveals that k;,, -km
On the other hand, it is useful to compare, for the duopoly situation, the expected price and output in the uncertain demand case with price and output in the certainty equivalent case. For the latter, the output obtains as In the uncertain demand case, under conditions (8) which guarantee that the firms choose the SSPE to be unconstrained up to state i', expected output writes as which, by (6), is equal to as in {14). AB for the expected price, we get and it is easily checked that this expected price is equal to P(2k). Accordingly, we obtain the following 
Concluding remarks
In this paper we have analyzed the investment behaviour of firms when they are simultaneously faced with a random demand and with rival firms in the industry. Under the restricted assumption of a linear demand with a random intercept over the states of Nature, we have shown that there exists a symmetric equilibrium at which firms operate in excess capacity, when compared with the capacity they would choose in the certainty equivalent case. Our analysis is original, we feel, to this extent that it deals with the strategic behaviour of firms when they operate in an uncertain environment.
The paper calls for two natural extensions. The first would be to generalize the above analysis to other cost structures and different random demand environments.
The other one would consider the problem of investment in entry deterrence when demand fluctuates randomly. We have in mind an extension of the paper by Dixit (1980) This completes the proof of proposition 2.
